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INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, North Carolina Superior Court Judge Robert
Hobgood ruled unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the
“Opportunity Scholarship Program” passed by the North Carolina
General Assembly.1 The law would have funneled $10 million in
taxpayer money to eligible families to help them pay for private
school tuition.2 Judge Hobgood dismissed the general assembly’s
efforts, stating that “[t]he General Assembly fail[ed] the children of
North Carolina”3 because the law failed to provide “sound basic
education” as constitutionally mandated by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.4 Judge Hobgood added, “it appears to this court that
the General Assembly is seeking to push at-risk students from lowincome families into non-public schools in order to avoid the cost of
providing them a sound, basic education in public schools.”5
The hostility towards the school voucher law expressed by Judge
Hobgood characterizes a recent trend in North Carolina state and
1. Hart v. State, No. 13 CVS 16771, 2014 WL 6724598, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug.
28, 2014) reversed by Hart v. State, No. 372A14, 2015 WL 4488553 (N.C. Sup. Ct. July 23,
2015); see Sharon McCloskey & Lindsay Wagner, NC School Vouchers Ruled
POL’Y
WATCH
(Aug.
21,
2014),
Unconstitutional,
N.C.
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2014/08/21/nc-school-vouchers-ruled-unconstitutionalstate-must-retrieve-distributed-funds/.
2. McCloskey & Wagner, supra note 1.
3. Transcript at 9, Hart v. State, 2014 WL 6724598 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2014)
(No. 13 CVS 16771), available at http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/Judge%
20Hobgood's%20Ruling%20granting%20Plts'%20MSJ%2008-21-14.pdf.
4. McCloskey & Wagner, supra note 1. Leandro v. State held that, while school
districts do not have a constitutional right to equal funding, the North Carolina
Constitution dictates that all children have a fundamental right to the opportunity to
receive a sound basic education. 346 N.C. 336, 354, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (1997).
5. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 8; McCloskey & Wagner, supra note 1.
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federal courts: teacher tenure,6 abortion restrictions,7 and rules to
limit political protests8 are all examples of legislation passed by the
North Carolina General Assembly only to be struck down by courts.
This trend has not gone unnoticed by members of the general
assembly.
To combat this course of events, state legislators passed a law
that changes the procedure for how constitutional challenges are
heard in North Carolina.9 On August 7, 2014, Governor Pat McCrory
signed into law a provision that requires all constitutional challenges
to the facial validity of state laws to be heard in front of a three-judge
court.10
Supporters of the law laud the attempt of the general assembly to
end plaintiff venue shopping, which state Senator Buck Newton said
severely “undercuts the credibility and legitimacy of the judiciary.”11
Others have been more critical of the general assembly’s action. In a
statement to the Charlotte Observer, the former President of the
North Carolina Bar Association Catharine Arrowood called the move
“extremely disturbing.”12 To Arrowood and others who share her
view, the general assembly’s move is not only unnecessary, but also
impractical and inefficient.13
North Carolina’s new law is unprecedented. No such law has
ever been implemented by any other state.14 The law has provoked
controversy and raised many questions. Among these questions,
perhaps the most central is simply, is this a good idea? Any answer

6. Jane Stancill, Wake Judge Orders Halt to End of Teacher Tenure in NC,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 16, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/
education/article9122282.html.
7. Sandhya Somashekhar, N.C. Abortion Restriction Violates Free Speech, Judges
Rule, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp
/2014/12/22/n-c-abortion-restriction-violates-free-speech-judges-rule/.
8. See Anne Blythe, More ‘Moral Monday’ Cases Dismissed After US Supreme Court
Ruling, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news
/local/crime/article9150071.html.
9. See Craig Jarvis, G.O.P. Moves to Restrict Court Challenges of N.C. Laws,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local
/article9152438.html.
10. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch.
100, § 18B.16.(a), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 241 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2014)); see Jarvis, supra note 9.
11. See Jarvis, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Section I.A. While history shows that the federal courts used a threejudge court to hear constitutional challenges, never before has such a model been
implemented at the state court level.
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requires an exploration of the constitutionality, practicality, and
policy behind the creation of this three-judge court. This Comment
begins such a discussion. In doing so, this Comment examines the
constitutionality of North Carolina’s new law, and, while finding the
three-judge court constitutionally acceptable, it argues that North
Carolina should not have adopted this procedural mechanism.
Drawing on lessons from the federal courts, this Comment contends
that the use of such a panel should be abandoned because it will cause
more problems than it solves.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the origins and
evolution of the three-judge court in the federal judicial system,
highlighting the reasons for its creation and its demise. Part II
introduces and explains the law creating the three judge-court passed
by the North Carolina General Assembly. Part III then addresses the
constitutionality of the law, finding that a challenge to the law will
likely fail, as precedent forecloses constitutional challenges. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the normative concerns raised by the new legislation
and calls for its abandonment by suggesting that the law is impractical
and unneeded. In doing so, it will argue that the use of a three-judge
court to hear constitutional challenges is unfair and inefficient and
that it unnecessarily politicizes the state judiciary. The piece
concludes by recommending revised statutory language that will
make the law more palatable to all citizens in the event that the
general assembly does not heed the call to abolish these courts.
I. THE HISTORY AND USE OF THREE-JUDGE COURTS IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The History of the Federal Three-Judge Court
While this Comment focuses on the legal and policy concerns
surrounding North Carolina’s creation of a three-judge court to hear
constitutional challenges, a background on the federal history of these
panels is needed. Providing a background on the history of the threejudge courts in the federal court system will contextualize the general
assembly’s recent actions and offer useful insights for the analysis of
the current legislation.15

15. See infra Parts III–IV.
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1. “The Muted Fury of Congress”:16 The Beginnings of the Federal
Three-Judge Courts
a.

The History of Ex parte Young

The genesis of the three-judge court begins in 1908 with the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Ex parte Young.17 The time
period surrounding the case was characterized by “vigorous social,
political, and economic expansion.”18 This growth, however, brought
new concerns. Massive industrial expansion led states to feel
increasingly pinched by the demands of big businesses.19 In response,
states implemented “novel regulatory and tax measures” in hopes of
“cop[ing] with the needs of the new industrial world.”20 These
regulatory measures proved ineffective because they were stymied by
the private sector’s most powerful and lethal weapon: federal
injunctions.21
The growing tension between the states and the federal courts
reached a fever pitch in 1908 when the Supreme Court decided Ex
parte Young. Two years before the decision, the state of Minnesota
enacted regulatory measures to reduce and fix railroad rates for both
passengers and freight.22 Railroad companies attacked the law on Due
16. WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994).
17. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
18. Elliott S. Marks & Alan H. Schoem, The Applicability of Three-Judge Courts in
Contemporary Law: A Viable Legal Procedure or a Legal Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 AM.
U. L. REV. 417, 419 (1972). Before 1900, courts had, on occasion, used multiple judges to
decide cases, as the first promulgation of such three-judge courts was in 1789, but instances
such as these were the exceptions to the use of a single judge. See David P. Currie, The
Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964).
19. Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 419.
20. Currie, supra note 18, at 5. Such measures included taxing, regulating working
conditions, and establishing public-utility commissions to set freight and passenger rates
on railroads. Id.
21. During this time period, federal judges repeatedly enjoined state officers from
enforcing regulatory measures, finding that regulations violated due process. Id. Such
injunctions were harmful to states because they paralyzed efforts by the states to protect
themselves from the damaging actions of a business until a final decision was rendered.
See id. at 6. Resentment and anger arose toward federal judges as these “stubborn
obstacles” continuously blocked the exercise of state regulatory power. See id. at 5; see
also Philip L. Merkel, The Origins of an Expanded Federal Court Jurisdiction: Railroad
Development and the Ascendancy of the Federal Judiciary, 58 BUS. HIST. REV. 336, 336–37
(1984) (discussing the rapid expansion of federal judicial power in the late 1800s and the
“suspicion and contempt” many people felt toward the federal courts as a result).
22. James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a Remedy, There’s a
Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 222 (2004). The
statute levied heavy fines and carried the possibility of prison sentences for any railroad
company that violated the law. Id. at 223.
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Process and Commerce Clause grounds, arguing that the rates
imposed by Minnesota were unconstitutionally confiscatory.23 The
district court issued a preliminary injunction against Minnesota
Attorney General Edward Young prohibiting the enforcement of the
regulations.24 Young, however, defied the command and issued a
petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the Northern Pacific
Railway Company to abide by the newly enacted freight laws.25
Young was then held in contempt of court and later challenged the
contempt order to the Supreme Court though a writ of habeas
corpus.26
Although unconventional in his approach, Young’s argument
that he could enforce Minnesota’s legislation seemed to rest firmly
upon Supreme Court precedent.27 The Court had recently held in Fitts
v. McGhee28 that the Eleventh Amendment prevented individuals
from suing state officers for injunctive relief when those offenses were
not directly authorized to enforce allegedly offensive state
legislation.29 As it was, Minnesota’s legislature had drafted the
regulatory measures in such a way as to avoid charging any particular
state official with the specific duty of enforcing the law.30 Thus, Young
argued that the railroad’s suit against him was, in effect, against the
state of Minnesota, which should guarantee him immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.31 Young’s argument, however, failed to

23. See Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young and the Fate of the ThreeJudge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2008).
24. Id. at 107.
25. Leonard, supra note 22, at 223–24.
26. Id. at 224.
27. See infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
28. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
29. Id. at 530. Such suits were suits against the state, over which federal circuit courts
had no jurisdiction. A year before, the Supreme Court decided Smyth v. Ames. There, the
court held that actions enjoining state officials from enforcing allegedly unconstitutional
laws were not foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment if the state officials were actually
charged with enforcing the law. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518–19 (1898); Solimine,
supra note 23, at 106.
30. Solimine, supra note 23, at 107.
31. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 132. This Comment examines Ex parte Young within
a very narrow frame, one that uses the case as a vehicle to explore the broader
congressional reaction to the decision and the creation and implementation of the threejudge court. Though a full doctrinal discussion of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is
beyond the scope of this Comment, in any effort to describe Young’s context, reference to
jurisprudence cannot be avoided in its entirety. For a full discussion of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Leonard, supra note 22 (analyzing Ex parte
Young in light of extensive historical background); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987)
(detailing the history of the Amendment over the last two centuries).
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persuade the Court. Justice Peckham wrote for the majority that a
federal court could enjoin a state officer from enforcing an
unconstitutional statute.32 Young lost his case, and the federal
injunction rendered impotent another state regulation. The response
to Ex parte Young led to the creation of the three-judge court.33
b.

Reaction to the Decision

Ex parte Young was not as revolutionary a case as congressional
and public reaction may have supposed it to be. The decision did
expand the Eleventh Amendment exceptions, but from a doctrinal
perspective, Ex parte Young’s holding was not entirely disconnected
from previous Supreme Court decisions.34 As one scholar noted: “[Ex
parte Young] did not fundamentally alter the role of the federal courts
so much as [it] gradually changed the labels under which litigants
continued to do what they had done in the past.”35 Thus,
understanding why the case created such a “storm of controversy”36
requires looking to the perception of the case rather than its result.
Ex parte Young ignited a tinderbox of outrage and resentment
over the ever-increasing power of the federal judiciary. As alluded to
above, the time period in which Ex parte Young was decided was a
time of tension between the progressive ideals of many states and the
conservative notions of economic regulation that pervaded the
federal courts.37 This tension, coupled with the Supreme Court’s
approval of a federal district court judge’s seemingly unbridled
discretion to issue definite and absolute orders that outstripped the

32. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
33. See infra notes 34–51 and accompanying text. Scholars and later members of the
Supreme Court have been critical of the court’s holding and rationale in Ex parte Young.
See, e.g., Currie, supra note 18, at 4 (“Behind the outlandish justification concocted to
support this holding lay the not implausible conviction that federal constitutional rights
could not be adequately protected without the intervention of federal equity; therefore the
philosophy of immunity had to yield.”).
34. Solimine, supra note 23, at 112.
35. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 81 (1997); see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962, 1032 n.325 (2002) (arguing that Ex parte Young was merely a gap-filler of
sorts because the Court “closed a potential gap in the availability of relief, restoring
traditional balance without having to repudiate or alter state sovereign immunity itself”).
36. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 465 (1974) (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 967 (2d ed.
1973)).
37. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 112–13.
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states’ regulatory power, became too much for many to overlook.38
This sentiment was best characterized by Senator Lee Overman of
North Carolina, paraphrasing Justice Harlan’s lone dissent in Ex
Parte Young: “We have come to a sad day when one subordinate
Federal judge can enjoin the officer of a sovereign State from
proceeding to enforce the laws of the State passed by the legislature
of his own State, and thereby suspending for a time the laws of the
State.”39
With the controversy now fully ablaze, the next two years of
congressional debate sought to find a solution to “placate the state’s
feelings of resentment and restore the dignity the states felt has been
lost.”40 Much of the debate and discussion centered on ways to limit
the breadth of power that the Supreme Court had vested in individual
federal judges.41 Initially, some in Congress called for the complete
abolition of federal injunctive power and put forward bills that would
have forbid all federal injunctions against the enforcement of state
laws.42 In support of such a measure, Senator Overman said, “If I had
it in my power, I would not allow a federal court to enjoin the
enforcement of a state statute.”43 But no matter how passionate many
in Congress were over the federal judiciary’s supposed affront to state
regulatory power, those like Senator Overman knew that in order to
gain widespread support for reform, they would have to pull their
punches and enact a more measured and temperate bill.
Accordingly, in June of 1910, after years of vigorous debate,44 the
Three-Judge Court Act was passed. Successfully attached as a rider to
the Manns-Elkins Railroad Act, the 1910 bill forbid federal district
court judges from issuing interlocutory injunctions against
unconstitutional state statutes, unless such an injunction were granted
by a district court comprised of a three-judge panel.45 While the
Three-Judge Court Act did not possess the bite that many in
38. See id. Ex parte Young was decided in the same era as Lochner v. New York, a
controversial decision striking down a state statute that regulated working conditions on
due process grounds. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Many contemporary
observers of the Court saw the Young decision as indicative of the Court’s ongoing
commitment to laissez faire economic principles. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 112.
39. 42 CONG. REC. 4847 (1908).
40. Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 420.
41. Id.
42. 45 CONG. REC. 7256 (1910).
43. Id.
44. Senator Overman first introduced a similar bill in 1908, but it died on the House
floor after being passed in the Senate. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 115–16.
45. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1910)) (repealed 1976).
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Congress had called for, those who supported the bill nonetheless
believed that the installation of a three-judge court would adequately
shield the states from the power of the federal judiciary.46 An
examination of the Senate debates at the time reveals this intent. For
example, Senator Bacon of Georgia stated that “the purpose of the
Bill is to throw additional safeguards around the enormous powers
claimed for the subordinate Federal Court.”47 Later in the debate,
Bacon revealed the fear that many members of Congress had of the
federal judiciary and pointed to the potential role that the three-judge
court could play in diminishing the court’s power:
If these courts are to exercise the power of stopping the
operation of the laws of a state, then at least let it be done on
notice and not hastily, and let there be the judgment of three
judges to decide such questions, and not permit such dangerous
power to one man. The necessity for this legislation is a very
grave one. It is a most serious trouble which now exists—that
by the action of one judge the machinery of state laws can be
arrested.48
To men like Bacon and Overman, the three-judge courts would
prevent abusive, imprudent exercises of judicial power. Short of
taking away injunctive power altogether—the thought was—the
three-judge courts afforded an adequate remedy.
Proponents of the bill also sought to even the playing field
between the states and the federal courts. The bill provided a direct
right of appeal to the Supreme Court from any decision of the threejudge court.49 The direct right of appeal sought to diminish the real
sting that injunctions brought—the ability to stop enforcement of a
state law until a final resolution.50 By providing a quick and timely
appeal, the bill provided a further layer of protection in case of a
panel’s adverse ruling.
Regardless of the bill’s strength, the Three-Judge Court Act
ushered in a new congressional disposition toward the federal
courts.51 The three-judge district court was here to stay and played an

46. 42 CONG. REC. 4853 (1908). Congress’s “muted fury” as expressed in the Act can
be explained by several factors, including congressional opposition to the three-judge
court and uncertainty that such a court would effectively curtail abusive judicial power.
ROSS, supra note 16, at 2. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 118.
47. 42 CONG. REC. 4853 (1908).
48. Id.
49. Mann-Elkins Act § 17.
50. See Currie, supra note 18, at 6.
51. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 152.
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increasingly pivotal role in the federal court system throughout the
next half-century.
2. Early Changes to the Three-Judge Court Act
It did not take long for Congress to augment the power of the
three-judge court. Initially, these changes were minor. In 1913,
Congress amended the legislation to have a three-judge panel hear
rulings on the constitutionality of state administrative commission
orders.52 The 1913 amendment also provided that a three-judge
district court must stay any federal court proceedings, if a state court
had stayed proceedings under state law, pending adjudication of
issues in state court. The 1913 Amendment, however, saw little use
and was later deemed superfluous by the Supreme Court.53
A more drastic change occurred in 1925. Previously, the threejudge courts were restricted to cases where only temporary injunctive
relief was sought, not permanent relief.54 This created the potential
for conflicting results between the three-judge courts and the
individual district court judges. Best stated, “[i]t is an anomaly to
require the presence of a circuit judge and two district judges to hear
an application for a preliminary injunction and then allow a single
district judge to pass upon the cause finally.”55 Congress corrected the
problem in 1925, adjusting the language of the Act to require threejudge courts to convene for both permanent and interlocutory
injunctions.56

52. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, § 266, 37 Stat. 1013 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
2281 (1948)) (repealed 1976).
53. See Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 292 (1923) (referring to the
language of the 1913 Amendment as “superfluous” because “the original statute covered
them”).
54. Mann-Elkins Act § 17; see also Solimine, supra note 23, at 123 (“[T]his distinction
was anomalous, since the rationale for the existence of a three-judge district court did not
sharply implicate different types of injunctive relief, and in theory, the one district judge
might deny relief when the three judges earlier might have granted it.”).
55. 66 CONG. REC. 2917 (1925) (remarks of Sen. Albert Cummins).
56. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 238, 43 Stat. 936, 938 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. 1253 (1948). It should be noted that the 1925 amendment was passed as a part of
the Judges’ Bill, which made the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction no longer
mandatory, and replaced the appeal of right with the writ of certiorari. See Solimine, supra
note 23, at 123. For a larger discussion of the history of the Judges’ Bill, see generally
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the
Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000) (tracing and analyzing the history of
certiorari in the Supreme Court, with emphasis on the Judges’ Bill).
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3. FDR, Court Packing, and the Use of Three-Judge Courts for
Constitutional Challenges
The 1930s brought to the forefront a new use for the three-judge
court: constitutional litigation. Throughout the decade, President
Franklin Roosevelt found many pieces of New Deal legislation
declared unconstitutional,57 such as the National Recovery
Administration58 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.59 Mirroring
the states’ resentment of the courts before Ex parte Young, Roosevelt
and members of Congress grew increasingly irritated that a single
federal judge could enjoin vital federal legislation.60 His battle with
the courts so infuriated Roosevelt that he suggested Congress pass
legislation regardless of concerns of constitutionality.61 In response to
adverse court decisions, Roosevelt concocted his “court packing” plan
to diminish the autonomy of the federal courts.62 The plan’s most
drastic measure was to add more members to the Supreme Court—up
to fifteen if Roosevelt had his way.63 This part of the plan, however,
did not come to fruition, as the Supreme Court famously upheld a
Washington state minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish64 that “eased the pressure”65 and caused Congress to “le[ave]
the Supreme Court alone.”66

57. See Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 422; Solimine, supra note 23, at 124.
58. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act’s delegation of legislative power to the
executive branch).
59. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (holding that Agricultural
Adjustment Act provisions were an invalid exercise of the federal taxing and spending
power).
60. See Currie, supra note 18, at 9.
61. For example, in a letter to Representative Samuel Hill, Roosevelt wrote the
following: “I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to the constitutionality,
however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation.” 79 CONG. REC. 13,449 (1935)
(letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Rep. Samuel B. Hill (July 5, 1935)).
62. February 05, 1937: Roosevelt Announces “Court Packing Plan,” HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan (last
visited Aug. 17, 2015); see also Stephan O. Kline, Revisiting FDR’s Court Packing Plan:
Are the Current Attacks on Judicial Independence so Bad?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 863,
864–65 (1999).
63. February 05, 1937: Roosevelt Announces “Court Packing Plan,” supra note 62.
64. 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937). This case still garners historical attention, as it
involved the alleged change of mind by Justice Owen Roberts—“the switch in time that
saved nine”—to uphold the law and save the integrity of the Supreme Court as it then
existed. For more, see generally Kline, supra note 62 (analyzing the court packing plan in
detail).
65. Currie, supra note 18, at 10.
66. Id.
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Though much of the ill-fated “court packing” plan “spectacularly
failed,”67 a remnant of the plan did survive and passed through
Congress in 1937—the use of a three-judge court. The new statute
expanded the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court to hear all
actions for injunctions where the constitutionality of an act of
Congress was challenged.68 The judges on the panel consisted of the
district judge before whom the original action was filed and two other
judges appointed by the chief judge of the circuit where the suit was
brought.69 By mandating a three-judge court for suits attacking
congressional legislation, Congress required that acts of Congress be
treated with a dignity equal to that required for state legislation.70 The
1937 revision to the Three-Judge Court Act propelled these
specialized courts’ jurisdiction into another arena—constitutional
litigation—an area that would see the use of these courts expand and
flourish in the coming decades.
4. The Beginning of the End: The Three-Judge Court During the
Civil Rights Movement
The three-judge court originally had a narrow scope and saw few
appeals during the early years of its implementation.71 The same
cannot be said for the 1950s and 1960s. During those decades, the
quantity of litigation before federal three-judge courts increased
greatly.72 This increase can be explained in large part by the Civil
Rights Movement.73 During this era, the function of three-judge
courts shifted from protecting the states from the federal government
to protecting private citizens from the states.
During the 1950s and 1960s, plaintiffs in civil rights cases strove
to find courts that they perceived as offering the best opportunity to
67. Michael Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts,
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 124 (2014).
68. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(1910)) (repealed 1976).
69. Id.
70. See Currie, supra note 18, at 11 (quoting 81 CONG. REC. 7045 (1937) (statement of
Sen. O’Mahoney)).
71. Cf. Solimine, supra note 23, at 123–24 (explaining that a large reason behind the
passage of the original 1910 Act was that the perceived burden of gathering three judges
to hear a case would be tolerable because those judges would only be hearing federal
issues “that were perceived to be more important than the issues raised in a typical case
that might end up before the [Supreme] Court”).
72. See id. at 126 (citing AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 317–18 (1969)) (“In the 1950s, there were about
fifty such cases each year, which steadily increased to about ninety each year during the
early 1960s, to 215 in 1969, and to a high of 320 by 1973.”).
73. See id.
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advance their causes.74 As such, from the beginning of its campaign to
fight segregation in the federal courts, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) strongly favored
litigating in courts with three-judge panels. Perhaps the cleverest use
of the three-judge court came in the landmark decision Brown v.
Board of Education.75 The case stands as an example of why threejudge courts were seen as advantageous to the advancement of racial
equality. The advantages were twofold.
First, Thurgood Marshall, then lead attorney for the plaintiffs,
molded his legal strategy in a way that would take advantage of the
three-judge court by tailoring lawsuits to attack state statutes rather
than attacking school boards directly.76 Marshall believed the threejudge courts both presented a way to potentially insulate his cases
from adverse rulings of individual judges and gave judges protection
to take the “bolder steps, on both the merits and remedies, that the
cases demanded.”77 Second, Marshall and the NAACP saw that using
the three-judge courts furnished a direct right of appeal to the
Supreme Court.78 At the time, the Warren Court was perceived as a
friendly tribunal, and, as such, the three-judge court offered a direct
path to the Supreme Court, especially as compared to the usual
appeals process.79
The use of three-judge courts by civil rights organizations did not
go unnoticed by Congress. Hoping to capitalize on the favorable
environment the NAACP found in the courts, Congress provided
provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 that expanded the use of three-judge courts.80 Of the two, the
Voting Rights Act proposed the more expansive use of the threejudge courts. Acknowledging the deep root of racial barriers in the
South, the Act vested power in three-judge courts to hear any action
in which a set of southern states called for a change in voting

74. See Mark Johnston, From Exclusion to Integration: The N.A.A.C.P’s Legal
Campaign Against Educational Segregation, 3 VOCES NOVAE: CHAP. U. HIST. REV. 203,
203–04 (2011).
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 56 (1994).
77. Solimine, supra note 23, at 127.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 136.
80. See id. at 131–32; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964)) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 10101(g) (2014)); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b–c (1965)) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. 10303(a) (2014)).
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procedure. The Act also provided a direct right of appeal to the
Supreme Court.81
These uses of three-judge courts to protect individual rights
against the states represented a shift away from the original
justifications of the 1910 Act. Recall that the original rationale behind
the panels was to protect states from the powers of the federal
government.82 In the Civil Rights Era, the use of the panels changed.
No longer were the courts used to protect states, but to attack state
policies through the advancement of individual causes.83 Scholar
Michael Solimine put it best when he noted that during this time
period “Congress [and private citizens] utilize[ed] the three-judge
court as a sword.”84 This ironic evolution of the utility of the threejudge court, however, did not last. The end of the Civil Rights Era
marked the twilight of the federal three-judge court.85
5. The 1976 Amendment and the Expiration of the Three-Judge
Court
Even as Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the three-judge
court, there were those in Congress and the legal community who
called for its abolition. These voices of dissent eventually won,
culminating in 1976 with legislation that ended the use of the courts
for suits regarding federal statutes.86 The road to the 1976
amendment, which restricted the use of such panels, was paved by
many. But the greatest influences were the federal judiciary and the
legal academy.
By the 1960s, prominent figures in the academic community were
calling for the end of the three-judge court. Perhaps the strongest
criticism of the use of the courts came from Professor David Currie of
the University of Chicago.87 Currie questioned the need for such
courts, arguing that “consuming the energies of three judges to
conduct one trial is prima facie an egregious waste of resources.”88
81. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 52
U.S.C. § 10303 (a) (2014)).
82. See supra Section I.A.1.b.
83. See Johnston, supra note 74, at 203–04.
84. Solimine, supra note 23, at 134.
85. See infra Section I.A.5.
86. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1976)).
87. See Currie, supra note 18, at 2–3. David Currie was a renowned Professor of Law
at the University of Chicago who specialized in constitutional history. See David P. Currie,
1936–2007, U. CHI. SCH. L., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/currie (last visited July 12,
2015).
88. Currie, supra note 18, at 2.
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Other scholars echoed this argument, noting that “it is clear . . . that
the three-judge court procedure has given rise to excessive and
complex litigation which has become more acute than the original evil
it was designed to eradicate.”89 To these commentators and others,90
the inefficiency of the panels simply outweighed any positives that the
courts offered.
This criticism on its own may not have fueled the movement to
end the three-judge district court. However, such critiques, when
coupled with the increasingly antagonistic disposition of the federal
courts, guaranteed the demise of the courts. Upon examination of the
early Supreme Court’s tendency to narrowly interpret the court
statutes, it is clear that the Court did not support outright the
institution’s creation.91 But the federal judiciary’s largest influence on
the abolition of these courts came through Chief Justice Warren
Burger.92 More than any other chief justice, Chief Justice Burger
“brought to the office a desire to increase administrative efficiencies
of all sorts at all levels of the federal courts.”93 Chief Justice Burger
relied heavily on a 1969 study by the American Law Institute
(“ALI”)—which argued that the 1937 amendment should be
89. Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 439.
90. For other critiques, see Solimine, supra note 23, at 137 n.177.
91. Michael Solimine points to several instances where the Supreme Court in the
1930s and 1940s disapproved of the use of such courts. He argues that the narrow
interpretation given to the early three-judge statutes signaled that the Court was not
willing to support a broad expansion of the courts’ use. See id. at 134–35 (“[A]lmost from
the beginning, the Court construed the direct appeal statute to permit it to dispose of cases
summarily without oral argument or a written explanatory opinion, in a manner similar to
the denial of a writ of certiorari.”).
92. See generally Carl Tobias, Warren Burger and the Administration of Justice, 41
VILL. L. REV. 505 (1996) (discussing Chief Justice Burger’s role in improving the
administration of justice throughout the federal court system). This is not to say that other
Supreme Court justices were not also critical of the use of the courts. Justice Potter
Stewart, in Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, observed that it was
important to continue to narrowly construe the three-judge statutes “in the interest of
sound judicial administration.” 419 U.S. 90, 98 (1974). Later courts also cited their
displeasure with the use of the three-judge district courts. One federal judge noted:
The legislative history of the repealing bill shows a thorough dissatisfaction
with the operation of three-judge courts, finding the procedure to be confusing
and inefficient. The Senate report states that “three-judge court procedure has
recently been termed by one scholar, ‘the single worst feature in the Federal
judicial system as we have it today.’ It has imposed a burden on the Federal courts
and has provided a constant source of uncertainty and procedural pitfalls for
litigants.”
Gilliard v. Kirk, 614 F. Supp. 1203, 1204 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-204, at 2
(1975)).
93. Solimine, supra note 23, at 139.
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rescinded—to mount a campaign to abolish the use of the three-judge
court.94 In 1972, the ALI released the Fruend Report, which
recommended abandoning the three-judge court model.95
By 1976, the death knell had sounded for the widespread use of
the three-judge court. With growing opposition from the legal
academy and the loss of the Supreme Court’s support, Congress
largely discontinued the sixty-year-old practice.96
6. The Remnants
Today, the use of three-judge courts remains most prominently
in reapportionment cases.97 Congress has occasionally created these
specialized courts to hear sensitive constitutional matters that require
a rapid resolution and direct appeal to the Supreme Court. As a part
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Congress required
the use of such panels.98 But whatever the three-judge court’s future
in the federal judiciary, the legacy of its rise and fall stands as a useful
starting point for understanding the current debate in North
Carolina.99
II. THE NEW LAW: CREATION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT
The creation of a three-judge court is not an entirely new
concept in North Carolina. In 2003, North Carolina introduced

94. See id. at 138–39.
95. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 596–99 (1973).
96. See Section I.A.5.
97. For a thorough discussion of the litigation and use of three-judge courts in
reapportionment cases, see generally Michael Solimine, The Three Judge District Court in
Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996) (discussing the structure,
procedures, and operation of three-judge courts in these cases in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s).
98. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81,
113 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2002)).
99. As expansive as is the history of these panels in the federal courts, documentation
of the history of its use on the state level is sparse. Few states across the country use threejudge courts; such panels are rare, and where they do exist, they are narrowly tailored to
serve a specific subject area of law. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-64b03(a)–(b) (2011)
(providing for three-judge courts to hear school finance cases, but also all constitutional
issues dealing with the power of schools boards, the state Board of Education, and the
Commissioner of Education); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 751.035(1) (West Supp. 2012)
(providing for three-judge courts to hear redistricting cases). Two other states, Alaska
(ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175 (2010)) and Colorado (Act of July 5, 1995, ch. 244, sec. 1,
§ 16–11–103 Colo. Sess. Laws 1290, 1290 (repealed 2002)) have used three-judge court
statutes to examine or set sentences in some limited number of criminal cases.
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legislation to use three-judge courts to hear redistricting cases.100 The
2003 law created a three-judge court composed of a senior superior
court judge from Wake County and two other state superior court
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.101 The law prohibits former members of the state legislature
from serving on these panels and requires that the state court, if it
finds that the state’s redistricting plan is unlawful, must provide the
legislature time to correct and redraw the districts.102 For ten years,
three-judge courts existed solely to hear these matters. But in 2014,
this all changed. Now, nestled within the language that allows panels
to hear redistricting cases lies a vast departure from state-level civil
procedure norms: a three-judge court to hear constitutional
challenges.
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation that
created a specialized court to hear all constitutional challenges to
state laws.103 The public statements of legislators allow a glimpse into
the motives behind the law. In response to a recent decision striking
down the general assembly’s teacher tenure plan, then-Senate leader
Phil Berger opined that Judge Hobgood’s ruling was “a classic case of
judicial activism.”104 Francis C. De Luca, a member of the
conservative Civitas Institute think-tank, echoed these sentiments,
admitting that “it had always bugged [me] that a local judge, maybe
not even elected, could just stop in its track an entire state law that
had been approved by both bodies and signed by the governor.”105
Thus, as followed Ex parte Young, fear of judicial activism and

100. Act of Nov. 25, 2003, ch. 434, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws (1st Extra Sess. 2003) (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1 (2003)), amended by Current Operations and Capital
Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch. 100, § 18B.16. (a), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 241 (LexisNexis).
101. Id. (“Upon receipt of that complaint, the senior resident superior court judge of
Wake County shall notify the Chief Justice, who shall appoint two additional resident
superior court judges to the three-judge court of the Superior Court of Wake County to
hear and determine the action.”).
102. Id. (“In order to ensure fairness, to avoid the appearance of impropriety, and to
avoid political bias, no member of the panel, including the senior resident superior court
judge of Wake County, may be a former member of the General Assembly.”).
103. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch.
100, § 18B.16.(a), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 241 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C GEN.
STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2014)) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General
Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be
heard and determined by a three-judge court.”).
104. Laura Leslie, Judge: Stripping veteran teachers of tenure rights unconstitutional,
WRAL (Raleigh) (May 16, 2014), http://www.wral.com/judge-stripping-veteran-teachersof-tenure-rights-unconstitutional/13650846/; see Jarvis, supra note 9.
105. See Jarvis, supra note 9.
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dissatisfaction with courts’ invalidation of legislation are at the root of
the new law. Now, the North Carolina General Assembly has set a
course to remedy these concerns, but it will not come without costs.
This Part will explore North Carolina’s creation of the three-judge
court to hear constitutional challenges and explain the key facets of
this law.
A. Creation of a Court to Hear Constitutional Challenges
North Carolina law now provides: “any facial challenge to the
validity of an act of the general assembly shall be transferred . . . to
the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be heard and
determined by a three-judge court of the Superior Court of Wake
County.”106 As written, the new law requires any and all facial
challenges to any law passed by the general assembly to be moved to
Raleigh, North Carolina (the seat of the Wake County Superior
Court), no matter where in the state the original action is brought.107
Thus, conceivably any civil lawsuit that wholly or partially consists of
a constitutional challenge will be uprooted and moved to Wake
County.108
An additional feature of the panels is that their members will be
chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North

106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2014).
107. Id. Unfortunately, the statute neglects to define what constitutes a facial challenge
as compared to a challenge that is “as applied.” See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994) (stating that
courts declare federal and state statutes unconstitutional in two ways. First, “the court may
declare it invalid on its face” or a “court may find the statute unconstitutional as applied to
a particular set of circumstances.” In the former situation, “the state may not enforce it
under any circumstances” whereas in the latter “the state may enforce the statute in
different circumstance”). However, case law may suggest something of an answer. In the
federal courts, a facial challenge requires that a plaintiff “establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which [an act] would be valid.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008). North Carolina case law on the subject is
limited, but it largely mirrors the federal courts. See State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 496–
503, 508 S.E.2d 277, 285–89 (1998) (denying a facial challenge to a domestic violence law
but finding the law unconstitutional as it was applied to the present defendant).
108. The problems inherent with this ambiguity will be discussed below. See infra
Section III.B. It should be noted that these panels will not hear “as applied” challenges.
Instead, the original Superior Court judge will continue to hear these cases and will
maintain the power to grant or deny an injunction. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3).
Also, facial challenges to state laws are strictly circumscribed to civil actions and outside
the reach of any criminal proceeding. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (“Nothing in this
section shall be deemed to apply to criminal proceedings, to proceedings under Chapter
15A of the General Statutes, to proceedings making a collateral attack on any judgment
entered in a criminal proceeding, or to appeals from orders of the trial courts pertaining to
civil proceedings filed by a taxpayer pursuant to G.S. 105-241-17.”).
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Carolina.109 This power is not without limits. In order to ensure
geographic diversity on the panel, the chief justice “shall appoint to
the three-judge court one resident superior court judge from the First,
Second, or Fourth Judicial Division, one resident superior court judge
from the Seventh or Eighth Judicial Division, and one resident
superior court judge from the Third, Fifth, or Sixth Judicial
Division.”110 Though the law does set out some parameters within
which the chief justice must confine his or her decision, there are few
guidelines to ensure methodological consistency in the chief justice’s
appointment decisions.
B.

Trial Consolidation and Venue

Another facet of this new law is the limited jurisdiction granted
to the panels. The panels are not tasked with deciding entire cases,
but only those claims facially challenging the constitutionality of a
state law.111 As the statute is written, a claim will only be transferred
and a three-judge court convened if “after all other questions of law
in the action have been resolved, a determination as to the facial
validity of an act of the general assembly must be made in order to
completely resolve any issues in the case.”112 It seems from the
language that if the original court can completely resolve the case
without reaching the constitutional issue, a potential constitutional
claim could be dead on arrival.
Along with their limited scope of review, there is no mechanism
in the law to automatically convene the panels. This is because the
language of the statute gives the power to transfer venue to the
original, superior court “on its own motion.”113 There is nothing the
parties can do. If venue is transferred to a three-judge court, the
original action will not be automatically stayed, but all matters that
are “contingent on the outcome of the challenge” will be.114 Finally,
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (“[T]he Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
appoint three resident superior court judges to a three-judge court of the Superior Court
of Wake County to hear the challenge.”).
110. Id. § 1-267.1(b)(2).
111. Id. § 1-267.1(a1) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General
Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be
heard and determined by a three-judge court.”).
112. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch.
100, § 18B.16.(b), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 243 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C GEN.
STAT. § 1-81.1(a1) (2014)).
113. Id.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42. The original language of the bill called for an
automatic stay of all proceedings, but it was dropped before it was passed in the Senate.
See Jarvis, supra note 9.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1893 (2015)

1912

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

following the decision by the three-judge court and after exhaustion
of all rights to appeal, the action will be transferred back to the
original court for resolution of any remaining issues.115 The bill’s
language reveals just how specialized and singular the role of these
courts will be—decide the constitutional issue and remand the case to
the original court.116
C.

Rights of Appeal

The final aspect of this complicated law is the unique appeals
process it establishes. The law bifurcates the appeals process
depending on the result reached by the three-judge court.117 If a panel
invalidates an act of the general assembly, the new legislation
provides an automatic right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.118 But if a challenge to a state law is rejected, no such
right of direct appeal exists.119 Instead, the party bringing the claim
must pursue an appeal through the usual appeals process.120 This
appeals process is unbalanced, providing one side with a fast track to
a final decision by the supreme court while relegating the other to the
normal pace of the court system.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW
From the above discussion, it is clear that this legislation stands
to impact civil procedure in the state for years to come.121 But those
who study, practice in, and depend on the legal system should not
accept this law without scrutiny. Careful examination of the law
reveals a variety of concerns and questions to be answered before
embracing this procedure. Of the many questions the law raises, the
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42 (“Once the three-judge court has ruled and all
appeal rights have been exhausted, the matter shall be transferred or remanded to the
three-judge court . . . for resolution of any outstanding matters, as appropriate.”).
116. See id. (“[The case shall be transferred] to the Superior Court of Wake County for
resolution by a three-judge court if, after all other matters in the action have been
resolved, a determination as to the facial validity of an act of the General Assembly must
be made in order to completely resolve any matters in the case.”).
117. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a1) (“Appeal lies of right directly to the Supreme
Court from any order or judgment of a court, either final or interlocutory, that holds that
an act of the General Assembly is facially invalid on the basis that the act violates the
North Carolina Constitution or federal law.”).
118. Id.
119. Act of Aug. 2, 2014, ch. 102, § 1, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws at 65–67 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2014)).
120. See id. (“Appeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals in any of the
following cases: From any final judgment of a superior court, other than the one described
in subsection (a) of this section . . . .”).
121. See supra Part II.
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first and perhaps most pressing question is whether the law passes
constitutional muster. Analysis of the North Carolina Constitution,
however, reveals weaknesses in arguments contending that these
panels are unconstitutional. Specifically, these three-judge courts
raise two central issues: (1) whether this three-judge court creates a
new court as prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution, and (2)
whether the legislation unconstitutionally restricts a court’s
jurisdiction. These are addressed in turn.
A. Does North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-267.1(a1) Create
a New Court?
North Carolina General Statute § 1-267(a1) calls for the creation
of a three-judge court to hear all facial constitutional challenges
raised by any case across the state.122 In doing so, it pulls superior
court judges from various regions to hear the constitutional challenge
and establishes these panels as the sole means through which such a
challenge can be heard.123 Article IV, section 1 of the North Carolina
Constitution prohibits the legislature from creating new courts and
only recognizes four distinct types of courts: the supreme court, the
court of appeals, the superior courts, and the district courts.124 Though
an offshoot of the superior court, these panels seem to be a new court.
The North Carolina Constitution provides no language that
allows for the superior courts to sit in a division or panel.125 Unlike
sections 6 and 7 of Article IV, which authorize the Supreme Court of
North Carolina and the North Carolina Court of Appeals to sit in
divisions, such language is absent from section 9’s discussion of

122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (“For each challenge to the validity of statutes and
acts subject to subsection (a1) of this section, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
appoint three resident superior court judges to a three-judge court . . . hear the
challenge.”).
123. See id. (“To ensure that members of each three-judge court are drawn from
different regions of the State, the Chief Justice shall appoint to each three-judge court one
resident superior court judge from the First, Second, or Fourth Judicial Division, one
resident superior court judge from the Seventh or Eighth Judicial Division, and one
resident superior court judge from the Third, Fifth, or Sixth Judicial Division.”).
124. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[The] General Assembly shall have no power to
deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as
a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize any courts
other than as permitted by this Article.”); see also id. §§ 6–10 (detailing the composition of
the various North Carolina courts, including the supreme court, court of appeals, superior
courts, and district courts).
125. See id. § 9.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1893 (2015)

1914

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

superior courts.126 The language of section 9 does provide for “one or
more superior court judges for each district” but does not dictate how
those judges are to hear cases.127 Even a historical examination of the
sections yields no answers as to whether the framers intended for
superior courts to empanel.128 This absence of express authority is
even more conspicuous when analyzed next to provisions that
expressly give the general assembly power over the judicial system.
The North Carolina Constitution explicitly grants to the general
assembly the power to determine the structure, organization, and
composition of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.129 Section 6
allows the General Assembly to increase the number of associate
justices up to eight.130 But the provision dealing with superior courts is
silent on the issue.131 Nowhere does it spell out how many superior
court judges are allowed to hear a single proceeding, and the absence
of such language in this provision in light of its presence in the other
provisions is conspicuous. Examining only the language of the
constitution, it is difficult to see how the use of a three-judge court
can fit into the constitutional definition of the superior court.
In addition to a four-corners reading of the constitution, case law
further calls into question whether the three-judge court constitutes a
new court. State v. Matthews132 presented the Supreme Court of North
Carolina with the opportunity to define the meaning of a “court”
within section 1 of Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution.133
There, the court ruled that a statute allowing police officers to issue
search warrants was unconstitutional because it authorized the use of

126. See id. § 6 (providing that the supreme court “shall consist of a Chief Justice and
six [but not more than eight] Associate Justices”); id. § 7 (“The Court shall have not less
than five members, and may be authorized to sit in divisions, or other than en banc.”).
127. Id. § 9.
128. Historically, superior court judges have exercised their judicial authority
individually, not jointly or empaneled with other judges. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL
NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 130–33 (2013) (explaining the
North Carolina Constitution’s provisions that allow the supreme court and the court of
appeals to sit in panels, but not providing similar commentary with regard to the superior
courts).
129. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (“The structure, organization, and composition of the
Court of Appeals shall be determined by the General Assembly.”).
130. Id. § 6 (“[T]he General Assembly may increase the number of Associate Justices
to not more than eight.”).
131. Id. § 9 (containing no such language).
132. 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967).
133. Id. at 41, 153 S.E.2d at 796 (“There remains for consideration whether the
General Assembly can confer upon a police officer judicial power sufficient to authorize
the issuance of a valid warrant under any circumstances . . . [t]he answer to this question is
to be found in Article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina.”).
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judicial power by entities not authorized by the constitution.134 To the
court, allowing a police officer to perform the job of a judge was
enough to constitute the establishment of a new court.135 In the
present context the issue is not nearly as clear-cut. The legislation
provides that superior court judges perform their usual duties but in a
different form.136 But this change in form can be seen as a change with
respect to what the constitution contemplates as a “superior court
district.”137 Though there is no separation of powers issue,138 three
judges performing the duties of what previously was done by one
judge could be construed as an exercise of judicial authority outside
the purview of the constitution.
These arguments are unlikely to persuade a court to hold the
creation and use of a three-judge court unconstitutional. As noted
above, North Carolina has used three-judge courts to hear
redistricting cases since 2003.139 Because the current statute was
added to the language of the redistricting statute, many arguments
that the creation of a three-judge court constitutes an unconstitutional
new court are foreclosed. Stephenson v. Bartlett,140 which upheld the
constitutionality of the panels to hear redistricting cases, addressed
many of these arguments.141 The Bartlett court gave short shrift to the
challenge presented. It was enough that the statute purported to
extend the procedures of the superior court without creating a court
outside of the constitution’s framework.142 In fact, the court dismissed
any real concern in a sentence, stating, “[t]his language places
redistricting challenges in the superior court, the court recognized by
the North Carolina Constitution as having original jurisdiction
throughout the state.”143

134. Id. at 43, 153 S.E.2d at 797.
135. Id. at 42, 153 S.E.2d at 797 (“A police officer is not an official of the General
Court of Justice . . . . Hence, the General Assembly lacks constitutional authority to confer
judicial power upon a police officer.”).
136. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (2014).
137. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (“The General Assembly shall, from time to time,
divide the State into a convenient number of Superior Court judicial districts and shall
provide for the election of one or more Superior Court Judges for each district.”).
138. See infra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
140. 358 N.C. 219, 595 S.E.2d 112 (2004).
141. Id. at 227, 595 S.E.2d at 117–18.
142. Id. at 227, 595 S.E.2d at 118 (“[The] language [of the statute] places redistricting
challenges in the superior court, the court recognized by the North Carolina Constitution
as having original general jurisdiction throughout the state.”).
143. Id.
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Because the current legislation mirrors the language used by the
2003 redistricting statute,144 there is little reason to expect a different
result. The Bartlett court’s quick dismissal of the issue may be an
indicator of the likely result of any challenge to the constitutionality
of these panels. Moreover, since the issue is no longer a matter of first
impression, stare decisis may keep any challenger from getting
another bite at the apple.
B.

Does Amended North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-81.1
Unconstitutionally Restrict the Jurisdiction of Constitutional
Challenges?

The law’s venue requirement raises a second question of
constitutionality. Venue is a procedural matter that the constitution
authorizes the general assembly to establish and dictate for the
superior court division.145 A venue provision simply sets the rules for
where an action is to be tried.146 The problem with the current
legislation is that it seems to cross the line from a mere venue
provision to one that limits the superior court’s jurisdiction to hear
constitutional cases.147 The statute establishes Wake County as the
exclusive venue for these three-judge courts.148 But in doing so, it
effectively limits the jurisdiction of constitutional cases to Wake
County Superior Court.149 Ordinarily, limiting the jurisdiction of the

144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (2014) (providing for the appointment of similar
three-judge courts by the chief justice in cases where the constitutionality of an act of the
North Carolina General Assembly is at issue).
145. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (“The General Assembly may make rules of
procedure and practice for the Superior Court and District Court Divisions, and the
General Assembly may delegate this authority to the Supreme Court.”).
146. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-82 (“In all other cases the action must be tried in the
county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants . . . reside at its commencement.”).
147. The principle that when the jurisdiction of a particular court is constitutionally
defined the legislature cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless
authorized to do so by the constitution is grounded in the separation of powers provisions.
See Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 327, 222 S.E.2d 412, 427–28 (1976) (“It is well settled that
the general assembly is without power to prescribe or to regulate the rules of practice or
procedure in the Supreme Court, in accordance with which it shall exercise its appellate
jurisdiction.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315
N.C. 127, 140, 337 S.E.2d 477, 484 (1985).
148. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch.
100, § 1-81.1(a1), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 243 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-81.1(a1) (2014)).
149. Venue and jurisdiction are distinct concepts. Venue is the place where a cause is
to be tried, whereas jurisdiction refers to the power the court has to render a judgment.
See Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 508–09, 78 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1953) (explaining the
difference between jurisdiction and venue provisions in the North Carolina General
Statutes).
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superior court is prohibited under the state constitution, as superior
courts are deemed courts of “original jurisdiction”150 that are “open at
all times for the transaction of all business . . . . ”151 This suggests that
each superior court judge should have equal and coordinate power as
others throughout the state. But the new legislation prevents this. For
example, previously, if a case arose in Jackson County, a Jackson
County judge would have heard the case. But today, there is no
guarantee that a Jackson County judge will be selected to sit on the
panel, as the statute only provides that one of the three judges
originate from preselected parts of the state.152 At bottom, the statute
seems to usurp power from what are supposed to be equal and
coordinate courts.
Despite this contradiction, the new legislation is unlikely to fail a
constitutional challenge. The North Carolina General Statutes allow
for some flexibility in venue provisions. For example, Section 1-83(2)
allows for changing the place of trial “when the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the
change.”153 While this language may not directly approve of the
change in venue mandated by the three-judge court statute, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has used it to authorize other
superior court panels.154 In Bartlett, the court upheld the use of threejudge courts for redistricting cases by relying, in part, on Section 183(2). The court suggested that the “policies implied” in the statutory
provision allowed for the redistricting courts to be held in Wake
County.155
Unfortunately, the Bartlett court failed to explain why a threejudge court met the criteria of Section 1-83(2). Despite this, venue
appears to be a malleable procedural matter subject to minimal
constitutional scrutiny.156 Accordingly, it is hard to see how the
current legislation could fall to a challenge on these grounds.

150. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(3) (“[T]he Superior Court shall have original
general jurisdiction throughout the State.”).
151. Id. § 9(2).
152. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (2014).
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2) (2013); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 358 N.C. 219, 228, 595
S.E.2d 112, 118 (2004) (“In addition, once an action is filed, venue is sufficiently flexible
that it may be changed according to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2).”).
154. Bartlett, 358 N.C. at 228, 595 S.E.2d at 118.
155. Id.
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2) (providing for a change of venue when “the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change”);
Bartlett, 358 N.C. at 228, 595 S.E.2d at 118.
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The Three-Judge Court and the Separation of Powers Doctrine

In addition to these more specific constitutional questions, the
three-judge court legislation passed by the North Carolina General
Assembly raises a broader separation of powers issue. The mechanics
of the law create tension between the judicial and legislative branches
of the state government. Despite this tension, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina would find a separation of powers
argument persuasive.
Article I, section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution provides:
“The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”157
The wording seems to forbid overlaps of power between the three
branches, but North Carolina courts have not interpreted the
language so strictly. Perhaps the best example of the provision’s
interpretation is found in Adams v. North Carolina Department of
Natural and Human Resources.158 In Adams, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, in a discussion regarding the relationship between
the legislative and judicial branches, stated, “it has long been
recognized by this Court that the problems which a modern
legislature must confront are of such complexity that strict adherence
to ideal notions of the non-delegation doctrine would unduly hamper
the General Assembly in the exercise of its constitutionally vested
powers.”159 Though speaking about the non-delegation doctrine,
implications for the present context can be seen. The court is unlikely
to construe the separation of powers doctrine so as to disallow some
overlap in the powers of the branches of government. As Professor
John Orth notes, “although separation of powers and the related
principle of checks and balances underlie American constitutions,
they have rarely figured as such in the important constitutional
decisions rendered by American courts.”160
157. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6. This doctrine has long held a significant place in North
Carolina’s Constitution, and the wording of the clause has remained the same since the
first constitution was ratified in 1776. See John V. Orth, “Forever Separate and Distinct”:
Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (“The principle of
separation of powers has been explicitly proclaimed in each successive North Carolina
Constitution with only slight variations in wording.”).
158. 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
159. Id. at 696–97, 249 S.E.2d at 410. For other examples of this interpretation of the
separation of powers doctrine, see Orth, supra note 157, at 8 n.45 (“Notwithstanding the
asserted absence of cases involving a separation of powers claim, the North Carolina
Reports contain numerous such cases, some of them quite recent.”).
160. Orth, supra note 157, at 1; see also Jacob Scot, Codified Canons and the Common
Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 382–83 (2010) (“Judges have developed common
law canons to protect and reinforce the separation of powers across constitutionally
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Coupled with the diminished state of the separation of powers
doctrine, a constitutional challenge would also have to confront the
strong presumption of constitutionality courts give to laws passed by
the general assembly. The clearest language establishing this
presumption is in Rowlette v. State.161 There, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals gave great weight to the presumption of constitutionality,
stating that, “unless the unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and
unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable doubt” the state’s
legislation will be upheld.162 Indeed, such a demanding standard will
be difficult for potential challenges to overcome.
In the end, any constitutional challenge to this law is likely to fail.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected many of the
applicable arguments when the three-judge court concept was first
brought to the state,163 and the three-judge court now created to hear
constitutional challenges possesses a structure and function similar to
its predecessor. In light of a weak separation of powers doctrine and
the strong presumption of constitutionality for laws passed by the
General Assembly, it is hard to imagine a court abolishing this new
law.
IV. “LET REASON HOLD THE REINS”:164 A CALL TO QUESTION THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NORTH CAROLINA’S NEW LAW
Even if North Carolina’s new three-judge court is constitutional,
this does not answer the question posited at the beginning of this
Comment—is this law a good idea? To answer that question, we must
look to the law’s probable effects and consequences and weigh them
against the purported state interest in empaneling three-judge courts
to hear constitutional challenges. On one side of the scale is the
importance of protecting legislative action and preventing venue
shopping.165 On the other side, this seismic shift in adjudicative
procedure will mar the efficiency of the court system. Additionally,
created governmental organs. The avoidance canon buttresses legislative authority to
make law and, at the same time, acknowledges judicial review to prevent the legislature
from overstepping its power.”).
161. 188 N.C. App. 712, 656 S.E.2d 619 (2008), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 474, 666
S.E.2d 487 (2008).
162. Id. at 715, 656 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 511, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684–85 (1993)).
163. Supra notes 132–43 and accompanying text.
164. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANAC 30 (U.S.C. Publishing Co.
1914).
165. See Jarvis, supra note 9 (“We wanted to do something [about venue shopping]
that would help the process, also help with the efficiency of having these matters that are
challenged heard in a consistent method for that.”).
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the law raises serious concern about the politicization of the judiciary,
which has the potential to damage the integrity of the courts. Each of
these concerns must be addressed in turn.
A. Practical Problems
The procedural mechanisms adopted by this new law are
complex.166 It is important to discern whether this drastic change is
practical. This section suggests two lenses through which to evaluate
the law’s practicality: efficiency and cost.
1. Efficiency
The first way to explore the practicality of this new legislation is
by examining its efficiency. The law’s ambiguity and the burden it
places on the court system will cause inefficiencies in the court
system. These problems will be addressed in turn.
a.

Ambiguity in the Law

In order to promote justice, courts must run effectively and
efficiently.167 The present legislation fails to advance these goals. This
is largely attributable to the law’s ambiguity. A close reading of the
statute raises more questions than answers. The law will likely cause
confusion among practitioners across the state.
First, consider the provision in the law providing that a threejudge court only convene if “all other matters in the action have been
resolved” and a determination of constitutionality must be made to
resolve the matter.168 This presents a question of interpretation for
courts. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: A plaintiff,
in this case the state, brings an action alleging that the defendant
violated a state statute. In its defense, the defendant argues that it did
not actually violate the statute, and in the alternative, that the statute
is facially unconstitutional.
The language of the statute offers no clear answer as to what the
court should do. If the original superior court judge decides that the
factual contentions should be heard first, what happens to the
constitutional challenge? If the court finds that the defendant did not
violate the state statute, technically this will resolve the lawsuit
because a determination as to the constitutionality would have no
166. See supra Part II.
167. See Warren Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049,
1049 (1972) (“Those who protest that efficiency is not the role of justice must be reminded
that protracting one case imposes hardship on all others awaiting their turn.”).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42 (2014).
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bearing on the result. But if the initial judge transferred the initial
decision to the three-judge court for a ruling on the constitutionality
of the law, and if the three-judge court found the law
unconstitutional, it would decide the case before any other matter was
considered before the original court. Indeed, the case may reach the
same conclusion, but it is discomforting and confusing that a rather
straightforward fact pattern can take either of two different
procedural paths and, at least in some instances, limit the arguments
brought by both parties. At bottom, it will all depend on the
interpretation of what “must be made in order to completely resolve”
the matters in the case.169 But because the law gives no guidance on
what factual assertions must be resolved before a three-judge court is
needed, litigants may receive inconsistent treatment depending on the
discretion of the original trial judge.
The appellate process created by the law adds to its ambiguity
and inefficiency. As noted above, the new legislation mandates an
asymmetrical appeals process based on the initial ruling of the threejudge court.170 Recall the hypothetical posed above. Assume that the
initial superior court judge sends the case to a three-judge court to
hear the constitutional challenge. The case will be sent to Raleigh.171
From there, the path of the case becomes complicated. If the threejudge court holds that the state statute in question is unconstitutional,
then the state has a right to immediate appeal to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina.172 If the statute is held constitutional, then the case
is sent back to the original superior court, subject only to the usual
appeals process.173 Once the three-judge court is empanelled, the
original superior court must “stay all matters that are contingent upon
the outcome of the challenge to the act’s facial validity pending a
ruling on that challenge and until all appeal rights are exhausted.”174
This means that if the plaintiff chooses to appeal the constitutional
ruling, then the case will have to go through the entire appellate
process before any of the factual matters of the case are heard. Taken
169. Id. § 1-81-1(a1).
170. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act
of the General Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake
County.”).
172. See id. § 7A-27(a1) (“Appeal lies of right directly to the Supreme Court from any
order or judgment of a court . . . that holds that an act of the General Assembly is facially
invalid on the basis that the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law.”).
173. See id. § 7A-27(b)(1).
174. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 42 (“The court in which the action originated . . . shall stay all
matters that are contingent upon the outcome of the challenge to the act’s facial
validity.”).
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to an extreme, if the plaintiff or defendant chooses to appeal the
factual ruling of the superior court after all of the constitutional issues
have been resolved, then it looks like the case will yet again make its
way through the court system until final resolution. In short, the
three-judge court could add two different courts, four different
judges, and two different locations to any litigation involving a facial
constitutional challenge. Such an onerous process is the epitome of
inefficiency.
Another concern is that the law does not dictate how colorable a
constitutional claim must be before it is sent to a three-judge court.
As written, the legislation mandates that “any facial challenge” must
be sent to Wake County if deemed necessary.175 It seems, at least
from a strict reading of the text, that no matter the viability of the
claim, if resolution of a constitutional claim is necessary, it will be sent
to a three-judge court. There apparently is no filter for frivolous
claims.176 In the appeals context, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has ruled that an appellant seeking review as a matter of
right must “allege and show the involvement of such question or
suffer dismissal” and that “[t]he question must be real and substantial
rather than superficial and frivolous.”177 Thus, meritless appeals are
sure to be dismissed.178 It is unclear how the viability of these claims
will be judged. Does the trial court make an initial ruling? Or does
the claim automatically go to the three-judge court without any
scrutiny? The former would defeat some of the purpose of having a
panel, and the latter opens up the three-judge courts to becoming a
weapon for litigators. If the law stands as is, litigators seeking to gain
an upper hand on their opponent could tack on frivolous
constitutional claims and force the other party to defend the
additional claim.179 The fear is that that these cases become more
about the parties’ financial resources than the merits of the case.

175. Id. § 1-267.1(a1) (emphasis added).
176. Id. (drawing no distinction between the type of constitutional claim that has to be
brought).
177. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 305, 163 S.E.2d 376, 383 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1087 (1969).
178. See id. (“The question must be real and substantial rather than superficial and
frivolous.”).
179. To date, this tactic has not been used. However, as North Carolina becomes used
to the mechanics of the law, it is not impossible.
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b. “If Past is Prologue”: Lessons from the Federal Use of ThreeJudge Courts
Even if we ignore the problems caused by the law’s ambiguity
and concomitant inefficiencies, the North Carolina General Assembly
would be wise to consider the demise of the federal three-judge court.
History provides a useful reminder of the burdens that flow from this
kind of legislation.180
The federal three-judge court largely owes its abolition to the
burdens that the process imposed.181 The 1969 American Law
Institute Report and the 1972 Federal Judicial Center Report are
instructive. The two main issues raised in the former report were the
increasing number of hearings convened before the three-judge
courts and the corresponding increase of direct appeals to the
Supreme Court.182 The report found that in the 1950s there were
around fifty cases each year, but the number had increased to 215 by
1969.183 Three years later, the Federal Judicial Center reviewed those
statistical findings and concluded that the increasingly heavy caseload
brought by these panels was too great to justify maintaining the
panels’ existence.184
The administrative difficulties examined in these reports also
inform the present context. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
considered and issued full opinions in more than fifty cases in 2014.185

180. See supra Section I.A.
181. See Currie, supra note 18, at 2; see also Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process,
Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 767, 783 (2007) (“Opposition to the three-judge court eventually arose in the federal
judiciary itself, in part based on the inconvenience of convening such courts at the trial
level, and in part due to the burden direct appeals placed on the Supreme Court’s
docket.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts, 17
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 125 (2014) (“Whatever the benefits of the three-judge district
court to litigants, particularly plaintiffs, many other influential observers eventually
concluded that they were outweighed by the administrative burdens on the courts.”).
182. AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 317–18 (1969) (“Concern over the burden that the three-judge
court statutes impose on the federal judiciary has heightened as the number of cases heard
by such courts has increased.”).
183. See id. at 317 (“The annual reports of the Administrative Office show that for the
years 1955–1959, the average number of such cases heard was 48.8 per year. In the years
1960–64, the average per year was 95.6 such cases.”).
184. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 596–99 (1972) (recommending
elimination of the three-judge court and direct review).
185. N.C. Appellate Courts, N.C. CT. SYS., http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/ (last
visited July 13, 2015).
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In addition, the court considered hundreds of other matters.186 The
new appeals process may greatly increase the number of cases the
supreme court could possibly hear. 187 The earlier hypothetical alludes
to this problem. 188 If the supreme court hears an earlier direct appeal
and then sends the case back down to the original superior court,
there is still a chance that other factual matters may find their way
back in front of the court.
Such an occurrence may be rare, but another recently enacted
bill by the general assembly may exacerbate the problem.189 Senate
Bill 853 rewrote North Carolina General Statute § 71-27, giving an
appeal of right to all North Carolina Business Court litigants directly
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.190 This stands to increase the
number of cases that the supreme court will hear.191 Thus, when
considered with the business court legislation, there may well be a rise
in administrative burdens and a heavier docket for the court.192
This inefficiency and increased burden on the judiciary is not
worth the law’s benefits. History has shown how the experiment will
end. The General Assembly has not offered new reasoning for the
need for these panels; Phil Berger’s exhortation that these panels will
cure judicial activism echoes the calls of the past.193 The difference is
that now we know that the benefits of three-judge courts do not

186. See id. (noting that these other matters may include “notices of appeals based
upon constitutional questions, petitions for discretionary review, petitions for writ of
certiorari in death cases, death stays, petitions for writ of certiorari in other criminal and
civil cases, petitions for writ of supersedeas, motions for temporary stays, petitions for writ
of mandamus, motions for appropriate relief, and direct appeals from decisions of the
Judicial Standards Commissions and the Utilities Commission”).
187. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2013) (instituting an appeal as a matter of right to
the Supreme Court from any decision of the court of appeals that involves a “substantial
question arising” under the Constitution of North Carolina).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 168–70.
189. See generally Act of Aug. 2, 2014, ch. 102, § 1, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 65–67
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2014)).
190. Id. (providing an appeal of right directly to the supreme court from specified final
judgments and interlocutory orders from the business court).
191. Before this law, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had heard one appeal from
the business court since January 1, 2013.
192. Indeed, there are already issues with the funding of North Carolina’s judicial
branch receives. Adding the numbers of cases that are heard by the Supreme Court will
surely add to the burden. See Yoon Ju Chung, NC’s Top Judge Says the State’s Justice
System Needs Funds, DAILY TAR HEEL (Chapel Hill) (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www
.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/03/ncs-top-judge-says-the-states-justice-system-needs-funds
(“The low budget allotted for local judicial systems [may] hinder timely trials due to the
workforce reduction.”).
193. See supra notes 48 &104 and accompanying text.
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outweigh the harm they cause. As such, it would be wise to heed the
warnings of history and do away with these panels.
2. Increased Cost and Concomitant Effect on Access to Justice
Thus far, the discussion of the practical effects of the three-judge
court has focused on the ambiguities associated with the law and the
burdens that the judicial system will now face. Now we must turn to
the possible effects this law will have on litigants. It is particularly
vital to assess the negative effects this law could have on the state’s
indigent population. Though the new panels will force all litigants to
adjust to the new procedures, the law’s potential adverse effect on
access to justice underscores why it should be opposed.
Today, equal access to justice remains something of a chimera.194
Much blame can be ascribed to the rising cost of litigation. The cost of
bringing a matter to court often “prevents more and more Americans
from realizing their rights.”195 The poor have a much higher frequency
of interaction with the justice system on a day-to-day basis than other
groups.196 For them, the law is “repeatedly encountered in the most
ordinary transactions and events of their lives.”197 As such, this group
of people depend on constitutional litigation as a means of social
mobility and change.198 As such, the indigent population position
within the justice system stands to be further minimized by this new
panel.
The history of the Legal Services Program (“LSP”) in the 1960s
and 1970s proves just how powerful a weapon constitutional litigation
can be for the poor. The LSP litigated hundreds of claims in front of
the Supreme Court during that time—with most being constitutional

194. See Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
303, 304 (1988) (“Legal resources can affect legal outcomes in several ways. Those with
more legal resources will often win at trial because the quality and quantity of legal
assistance makes a difference to the persuasiveness of a case, be it through superior
investigative work, specialization of legal talent, better law libraries, or simply because
attorneys can devote more time to preparation.”).
195. Issachar Rosen-Zui, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2010).
196. Austin Sarat, “ . . . The Law is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 (1990) (“The legal
consciousness of the welfare poor is, I will argue, substantially different from other groups
in society for whom law is a less immediate and visible presence.”).
197. Id.
198. This reality is also shown by the NAACP and their usage of the three-judge courts
in the 1950s and 1960s. See Johnston, supra note 74, at 213–14 (describing the use of a
three-judge court in 1950s cases challenging the constitutionality of segregated schools).
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claims.199 In doing so, these lawyers were able to alleviate the financial
barriers to access to justice.200 But the three-judge court will dull the
sharp blade of constitutional litigation for the poor by seriously
depleting the resources of those programs that provide services to
these populations.
In 2012, now-retired Supreme Court of North Carolina Chief
Justice Sarah Parker reported that there was one lawyer for every 554
people in North Carolina and one legal services attorney to represent
every 19,160 of the state’s poor.201 Moreover, the same report
revealed that legal aid offices were forced to turn away almost eighty
percent of qualified clients.202 Thus, even for “legal problems affecting
basic human needs” there are not enough attorneys.203 Given the
limited resources, programs that provide these services will be hard
pressed to muster the kind of diverse constitutional litigation that
made the LSP so successful because their limited resources may
relegate them to triage work rather than filing constitutional
litigation.204
This shortage of resources will only increase because of the cost
effects of the three-judge court. The creation of the three-judge court
increases the complexity of constitutional litigation across North

199. SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 59 (1990) (providing a chart listing the number
of constitutional claims before the Supreme Court).
200. See id. at 68 (“[T]he LSP presented the Supreme Court with a heterogeneous
collection of its clients’ problems. [Cases involved] transfer programs, the criminal justice
system, shelter, personal well-being, legal procedures, financial relationships, [and]
political rights.”).
201. Gene Nichol, Most of NC’s Poor Cannot Afford Legal Representation, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/10/26/3312112
_an-ironic-f-in-access-to-equal.html?rh=1 (“N.C. Supreme Court Chief Justice Sarah
Parker reported last year there is one lawyer in North Carolina for every 554 people and
one legal services attorney for every 19,160 poor people.”).
202. Id. (“Heroic legal aid offices are forced to turn away up to 80 percent of qualifying
clients because they don’t have the resources to serve them.”). As sobering as that statistic
is, there are further plans to reduce the Legal Aid Budget. See North Carolina’s Legal Aid
Funding Threatened by N.C. General Assembly Budget, LEGAL SERVS. OF S. PIEDMONT,
http://www.lssp.org/north-carolinas-legal-aid-funding-threatened-by-n-c-general-assemblybudget/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2015) (“The N.C. General Assembly budget in its current
state includes devastating funding cuts for LSSP and the state’s two other legal aid
providers, Legal Aid of North Carolina and Pisgah Legal Services.”).
203. LEGAL AID OF N.C., https://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/about/default.aspx
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
204. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina’s existence
depends entirely on private donations from concerned individuals, foundation grants, and
bequests. See Join the ACLU, ACLU, https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/Join-/Support/support-donate.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2015).
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Carolina.205 And added complexity comes with monetary costs—when
“the complexity of law and procedure increase, the total cost of
resolving a matter goes up.”206 As noted above, the appellate process
as written is unbalanced and can be exceedingly convoluted where an
action presents claims other than a constitutional challenge.207 This
complexity will likely increase costs for litigants across the state. As
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of North Carolina Legal
Foundation Director Christopher Brook describes it,
The state has resources at its disposal to defend challenged
provisions. An individual often does not. The state often has
experience defending the constitutionality of provisions. Very
few other attorneys in the state do constitutional work. These
measures tip the balance even more in favor of the state by
making it more costly to challenge provisions. These costs are
not borne equally by the parties and the state can now arrive at
the conclusion of litigation more quickly than the party
challenging the provision.208
Thus, combining the inherently limited resources of the indigent with
an increase in cost to bring constitutional challenges will exacerbate
an age-old dilemma for many legal service providers: they can
represent everyone they possibly can, or they can save resources and
only take the strongest cases that they think they will win despite the
unfair playing field the law creates. The former expends resources,
and the latter reduces access to the courts. Either consequence may
be exacerbated by this law, further marginalizing the poor and
powerless in North Carolina.
B.

Political Implications and the Harm to the Integrity of the
Judiciary

The effect that this law will have on litigants and judges is not
limited to tangible cost increases and growing caseloads. The new law
stands to harm the legitimacy of the court both in the eyes of the
public and through political pressures that will be placed on those
judges chosen to sit on panels.

205. See infra Section IV.A.
206. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV 953, 965 (2000).
207. See supra Section IV.A.1.a.
208. E-mail from Christopher Brook, Dir., ACLU of N.C. Legal Found., to author
(Nov. 16, 2014, 07:50 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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1. Lowering The Public’s Estimation of the Court
Scholars have argued that “the effectiveness of the judicial
system is dependent on its perceived legitimacy.”209 This concept of
“perceived legitimacy” rests in many ways on the public’s perception
that the legal system is fair and effective.210 In the criminal law
context, the legitimacy of police action and the moral credibility of
the law are said to “strengthen social norms and increase compliance”
because if the law is perceived as fair it is worth being followed.211
These reflections can shed light on the events in North Carolina. The
three-judge court statute threatens to reduce public trust in the
fairness of the judiciary.
The panel system will undermine the “perceived legitimacy” of
the judicial system because the mechanics of the law adversely affect
those challenging constitutional measures.212 Creating a mountain for
one side to climb, while providing a path of ease for the other, raises
basic questions of fairness.213 As described by the North Carolina Bar
Association’s former president, Catharine Arrowood, the panel
“doesn’t seem like it has the right ring of fairness.”214 Law is a public
good, especially constitutional law, because it affects not only the

209. See Montre D. Carodine, Street Cred, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1583, 1592 (2013);
Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in
Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 183 (2009) (“[C]ordoning off police decisions from public
scrutiny encourages public distrust of the police. As a number of studies of public attitudes
toward policing have shown, trust is much more effective as a foundation for public
compliance with the law than the threat of punishment or reliance upon personal
morality.”); see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57–60 (1990) (studying
the effects of people’s judgments about the outcome favorability, distributive fairness, and
procedural fairness of their recent personal experiences in small claims court on their
attitudes about the legitimacy of legal authorities).
210. Carodine, supra note 208, at 1591 (arguing that “the value of the public’s trust to
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the legal system” should never be dismissed); see also
Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2058–69 (1993)
(arguing that due to insurmountable obstacles to litigation standing in the way of the less
affluent, the current system of civil justice fails to deter public and private actors from
engaging in wrongdoings).
211. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2005).
212. Recall the bifurcated appeals process the law implements. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-27(a1) (2014). This uneven appeals process runs afoul of notions of procedural
justice. Procedural justice can “affect how litigants react to decisions and how the public
views the legitimacy of the judiciary.” Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of
the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1951, 1956 (2013).
213. See Jarvis, supra note 9 (“A requirement that appeals go directly to the Supreme
Court undermines the current system in which the appellate court filters out most of the
cases so that only the most important ones end up on the highest court’s docket . . . . [o]nly
a limited number of cases can be heard . . . and that restricts citizens’ right to appeal.”).
214. Id.
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litigants of a case but also all persons across the state.215 Thus, if a
system the public relies on to be equitable and fair hampers or
prevents efficient resolution of constitutional issues, the effectiveness
of the judicial system is impaired by reduced public trust.
Moreover, the inner workings of the law cannot be considered in
isolation from the political context in which the law was implemented.
In the past few years, North Carolina has experienced political
turnover that has not come without unrest.216 The “Moral Monday”
demonstrations have seen over 700 people arrested as a result of
protests over Republican legislative policy since last year,217 and
political tension remains at fever pitch.218 The majority of these
policies, such as new voter identification laws or the refusal to expand
Medicaid, have particularly strained the indigent population of the
state.219 Situated within this context, it is easy to see how the general
assembly’s three-judge court law could further strain the relationship
between the government and the governed. If the three-judge court is
perceived to be a wall meant to insulate the general assembly’s
decision making, it could irreparably harm North Carolina’s view of
the justice system. Whatever the general assembly’s intentions, what
matters is perception, as any perception of the court system’s
illegitimacy damages its utility.220 By infusing the foul odor of politics
into the most apolitical branch of government, the three-judge court,
especially in the existing political climate, will create a credibility gap
between the government and the people who use the system to hold
their government accountable.

215. See Rosen-Zui, supra note 194, at 720 (“[S]ince law is a public good, a suit that
ends in a judicial resolution often not only serves the litigants at hand but also spills over
to many other parties.”).
216. See Richard Fausset, With State Control, North Carolina Republicans Pursue
Smaller Prizes, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/us/withstate-control-north-carolina-republicans-pursue-smaller-prizes.html?_r=0 (noting that
Republicans control the North Carolina General Assembly for the first time since
Reconstruction).
217. Editorial, The Decline of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/the-decline-of-north-carolina.html?_r=0.
218. See id. (“But the bad news keeps on coming from the Legislature, and pretty soon
a single day of the week may not be enough to contain the outrage.”).
219. See id. (“[S]tate government has become a demolition derby, tearing down years
of progress in public education, tax policy, racial equality in the courtroom and access to
the ballot.”).
220. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic
Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1998) (arguing
that the preservation of democracy depends upon not only the independence of judges but
also the public’s perception—and therefore trust—that judges are independent).
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2. Harm to the Independence of the Judiciary
Not only will the mechanisms implemented by the three-judge
court harm the legitimacy of the court, but the mandate that the chief
justice of the supreme court choose the members of the panels is also
cause for concern. North Carolina is among the states whose
constitutions require election of all judges.221 These elections are
comprised of non-partisan primaries, a method thought to maximize
the power of the state’s voters in the decision-making process.222
Though there is considerable debate as to the virtues and vices of
such a system,223 the new legislation’s call to have an elected chief
justice select the members of each panel will undermine public
confidence and unfortunately project an image of a system infested
with political bias.224
To be fair, the law does claim to “ensure fairness, to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, and to avoid political bias” by diversifying
the membership of each panel, and it prevents any former member of
the general assembly from serving on a panel.225 However, there
remain real questions as to the methodology that the chief justice will
employ in choosing the panels. Granted, the law mandates that a
judge come from three predetermined locations in the state, but the
chief justice has no other parameters inside which his or her choices

221. See Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North
Carolina Experience and the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1966
(2011).
222. See id. In 1996, the general assembly enacted legislation to ensure that superior
court judges were elected in the same non-partisan primaries. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996,
ch.9, § 7-20, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 541–44 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163 (2013) (“[T]here shall be a primary to narrow the field of candidates to
two candidates for each position to be filled.”).
223. On one side of the debate, commentators laud such elections because they are
thought to give a voice to voters in a much more complete manner than others. See Jack
Park, Judicial Elections: The Case For Accountability, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y
163, 163 (2011). The other side expresses doubt to these views, arguing that such elections
do harm to the rule of law. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726–30 (1995) (“First, the rights
of individuals and unpopular minority groups may be compromised by an elective
judiciary. Second, and more mundane but no less important, the impartial administration
of . . . justice may be compromised.”).
224. A recent Gallup poll captured the tendency of the public to have less than
complete trust in the judicial system. Only sixty-eight percent of those polled agreed that
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court did let personal or political views influence how they
decided cases. See Americans’ Views on the Issues, N.Y. TIMES. (June 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2013/06/06/us/new-york-times-cbs-news-poll-june2013.html.
225. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 26A-1-267.1(b) (2013).
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will be fenced.226 This is not to say that the chief justice should not be
trusted to make this decision, but he or she should not be placed in
such a predicament. The chief justice will be placed into a partisan
position by virtue of having to make a choice.
Whatever pressure the new law places on the chief justice will be
felt tenfold by the members of the presiding panels. A study of
federal three-judge courts showed that judges on these panels handle
cases differently than they do individually.227 Of particular relevance,
these studies have found that federal judges do, at least implicitly,
decide cases with the hope for unanimous decisions.228 In basic terms,
it means that a Republican judge is more willing to side with two
Democratic judges on an issue that they might usually be opposed to,
for instance affirmative action.229 Thus, such studies prove that the
political orientation of two judges can be an accurate predictor of how
a panel will decide a case.230 Indeed, this can cut either way for a party
trying to challenge a law depending on the members of the panel. So
while the results can perhaps be favorable to a given party, these socalled “panel effects” are ugly truths of empanelled judges insofar as
a judge’s political orientation plays a larger role in decision making
than it should.231
No such study has been conducted for North Carolina courts, but
language in one redistricting case can substitute for the lack of
empirical evidence. In 2013, a three-judge court convened to hear the
initial challenge to new voting maps drawn by the general assembly.232
The opinion’s introduction squarely addressed the political concerns
226. Id. § 1-267.1(b) (2014)).
227. Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence From United States District
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2005).
228. Id. at 1263.
229. Id. at 1238–39 (“The greater willingness to strike down the Guidelines as part of a
panel may reflect a hesitance by judges to strike down such an important federal policy
without the support of their colleagues. This is especially true given the great political
popularity of the Guidelines at the time; some judges may perceive panels as providing
political cover for unpopular decisions.”).
230. Id. at 1252 (“These panel effects can be dramatic. In some areas of law, the
political orientation of the other judges on a panel is an even better predictor of a judge’s
vote than is the judge’s own political orientation.”).
231. Id.
232. Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11 CVS 16896, 2013 WL 3376658, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct.
July 8, 2013), aff’d Dickson v. Rucho, 367 N.C.542, 746 S.E.2d 238 (2014), vacated and
remanded by Dickson v. Rucho, 135 S. Ct. 1843 (2015) (remanding in light of Ala. Legis.
Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015)). Later in 2014, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina upheld the ruling of the three-judge court and found the voting
maps constitutional. See Colleen Jenkins, North Carolina Judges Uphold GOP-Drawn
Voting Districts, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/ususa-north-carolina-redistricting-idUSKBN0JX2DC20141219.
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that have been discussed in this Comment.233 The court acknowledged
the political importance of its decision, but was careful to cover its
own tracks:
This decision was reached unanimously by the trial court. In
other words, each of the three judges on the trial court—
appointed by the North Carolina Chief Justice from different
geographic regions and each with differing ideological and
political outlooks—independently and collectively arrived at
the conclusions that are set out below.234
Notably, the language expressed by the judges seems to be a
collective note asking for understanding from the reader; one can feel
the tension in the passage. Thus, if anything, this admission by the
court suggests that three-judge courts put these judges in a tough
spot. This is not to say that arriving at a constitutional decision alone
is easy, but the effects of the panels on the political psyches of judges
are sure to make their jobs more difficult than is necessary.
A past president of the American Bar Association, Jerome
Shestack, once said that “what marks our nation from so many
unstable or authoritarian governments is, to a substantial measure,
the independence of our judges as preservers of our constitutional
rights.”235 Though referring to the federal judiciary, whose members
are appointed for life, Shestack’s words have some salience in the
present context. North Carolina’s judges are not appointed for life, so
they are not free from, at least in the abstract, political and outside
pressures to decide cases in a wholly impartial manner. Forcing the
chief justice to choose and the superior court judges to decide as a
panel will dilute much needed judicial independence in North
Carolina’s courts.
The use of a three-judge court to hear constitutional challenges
will harm the judiciary and the citizens who depend on it to
function.236 Inside the judicial chambers, it forces judges to confront
the political ramifications of their decisions and possibly even change
their votes according to the pressure such a choice will bring.237 No
legislation can be worthwhile if it operates despite these unfortunate
consequences. Outside the halls of the courtroom, the politicization of
233. See supra Section IV.B.
234. Rucho, 2013 WL 3376658, at *2.
235. Kenneth Jost, The Federal Judiciary, Are the Attacks on U.S. Courts Justified, 8
CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 217, 221 (1998).
236. See supra Section IV.B and accompanying text.
237. See Taha, supra note 227, at 1263 (providing statistics on the effect of en banc
panels on the decisions and votes of judges).
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the three-judge court legislation will sap the trust of the court system
from the state’s citizens. Both implications damage the integrity of an
institution that is worth preserving.
C.

A Step in the Right Direction

A critique without a solution adds little value to a discussion.
Thus, to conclude, this Comment will briefly recommend some
suggestions that could possibly address some of the major concerns
presented in this article. Of all of the issues surrounding the passage
of this new legislation, of most concern is the unbalanced appellate
process. Not only will it contribute to inefficiency in terms of
prolonged litigation and wasted time, but it projects an image of
unfairness that will taint the judicial system as a whole.238 The
following proposed language to General Statute § 7A-27239 seeks to
address these concerns.
Appeal as a right lies directly to the Supreme Court from any
order or judgment of a court, either final or interlocutory that is
brought pursuant to G.S. 1-267.1 that holds an act of the
General Assembly is facially invalid or valid on the basis that
the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law.
This subsection shall apply where the State, a political
subdivision of the state, or any other litigant is a party in the
civil action brought before a three-judge court.
Though this proposed language still mandates that each appeal be
heard directly by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, it does not
differentiate between parties bringing the appeal. Balancing the
appeals process could go a long way toward ameliorating some of the
concerns mentioned throughout this section. This proposed solution
does not eliminate the effects of panels on judges’ decision making or
the increased burden on the high court. But this proposal ensures that
every litigant enjoys the same treatment under the law. Thus, despite
the ambiguity in the law and the effect it will have on the judiciary,
this change at least addresses the important need of preserving the
legitimacy of the court system.

238. See supra Section IV.A–B for discussion of the litany of concerns created by this
law.
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a1) (2014).
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CONCLUSION
A zoning dispute out of Boone, North Carolina marks the
beginning of a new era of constitutional litigation in the state.240
Debate about the use of a three-judge court to hear these cases is sure
to escalate as each new challenge makes its way to Raleigh to be
heard. Chief among the questions raised, however, must be the one
posed at the outset of this Comment: Is this a good idea? This
Comment has answered with a resounding no and argued that, at this
new dawn of civil procedure, the North Carolina General Assembly
should reconsider its choice.
Though the law is likely constitutional, legal validity does not
equal good policy. Its effects and its consequences must ultimately be
the standard by which we measure the validity of a law. Therefore, a
more holistic evaluation is necessary. This Comment has shown that
the institutionalization of the three-judge court brings with it a litany
of concerns ranging from the integrity of the judiciary to the lives of
the state’s most vulnerable citizens. Such far-reaching consequences
cannot be ignored, especially when the general assembly’s concern in
passing this law is to stop venue shopping and guard against judicial
activism. These concerns may be valid, but in this case the means do
not justify the ends. We have been here before; the history of the
federal courts tells us what will happen.
Stereoscopic sight allows the human eye to combine two images,
affording us the ability to see with greater depth and breadth than
each eye could see on its own. With one eye on the potential effects
that this law will have and the other on the lessons of the past, this
Comment is a first effort to peer into the ramifications of this new
legislation. Though the future is unclear, the people of North
Carolina and the general assembly should not hold their breath
waiting for positive change from this law.
JOSHUA A. YOST**
240. Anne Blythe, Boone Zoning Case is First to Test North Carolina’s New ThreeJudge Panel, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Nov 18, 2014), http://www.newsobservercom
/news/politics-government/state-politics/article10135529.html.
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Review for making this piece far better than I could have done on my own. Special thanks
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